W01 --本週課目標題--

2024-02-20-Tuesday 14:00-16:30 李正文 chengwen@cycu.edu.tw

W02 --本週課目標題--

2024-02-27-Tuesday 14:00-16:30 李正文 chengwen@cycu.edu.tw

• Max Presentation:
  
  Max
  問題涉及到會計學的一個研究主題，即無形資產的會計政策選擇是基於資訊披露的動機還是操縱利潤的動機。 我會嘗試為您簡要地解釋這句話的意思，並提供一些資料鏈接，供您進一步了解。
  無形資產是指無法觸摸或看見，但能夠為企業帶來經濟效益的資產，如商譽、專利權、商標權、版權等。 無形資產的會計處理通常涉及到一些會計政策的選擇，如資本化或費用化、減值測試或攤銷、減值金額或攤銷年限等。 這些會計政策的選擇會影響企業的財務報表，如資產負債表、損益表、現金流量表等，進而影響企業的績效評價、信用評級、市場價值等。
  Intangible assets refer to assets that cannot be touched or seen, but can bring economic benefits to the enterprise, such as goodwill, patent rights, trademark rights, copyrights, etc. The accounting treatment of intangible assets usually involves the selection of some accounting policies, such as capitalization or expense, impairment test or amortization, impairment amount or amortization period, etc. The choice of these accounting policies will affect the company's financial statements, such as balance sheet, profit and loss statement, cash flow statement, etc., and then affect the company's performance evaluation, credit rating, market value, etc.
  
  因此，無形資產的會計政策選擇可能有兩種不同的動機，一種是資訊披露information disclosure的動機，一種是操縱利潤的動機。 資訊披露的動機是指企業選擇能夠反映其真實經營狀況和無形資產價值的會計政策，以便向投資者和其他利益相關者提供準確和完整的資訊，提高企業的透明度和信譽。 操縱利潤的動機是指企業選擇能夠調整其利潤水平和變動性的會計政策，以便達到其自身的利益目標，如避免損失、增加獎金、降低稅負等。
  Therefore, the choice of accounting policy for intangible assets may have two different motivations, one is the motivation for information disclosure, and the other is the motivation for profit manipulation. The motivation for information disclosure refers to companies choosing accounting policies that can reflect their true operating conditions and the value of intangible assets in order to provide investors and other stakeholders with accurate and complete information and improve the company's transparency and credibility. The motivation to manipulate profits means that companies choose accounting policies that can adjust their profit levels and variability in order to achieve their own interests, such as avoiding losses, increasing bonuses, reducing tax burdens, etc. 這句話的意思是，無形資產的會計政策選擇是基於資訊披露的動機還是操縱利潤的動機，這是一個值得研究的問題，因為它涉及到企業的會計行為和市場反應的關係，以及會計準則和監管機制的作用。 這個問題的答案可能取決於不同的情境因素，如企業的無形資產比例、市場競爭程度、會計準則的靈活性、監管機制的嚴格性等。
  
  參考資料
  1.維基百科無形資產
  2.知乎無形資產的會計處理
  3.中國知網無形資產的會計政策選擇對企業價值的影響
  
  
  - Three alternative, not mutually exclusive, perspectives on accounting method choice are efficient contracting, opportunistic behavior, and information perspective 關於會計方法選擇的三種替代而非相互排斥的觀點是有效契約、機會主義行為和資訊觀點
  - (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986), The first two perspectives are the core of PAT which seeks to explain and predict managers’ choices of accounting methods. (Deegan, 2014, p. 323). PAT considers firms as a nexus of contracts between various self-interested individuals within and outside the firm and explains how financial accounting can be used to minimize the cost implications associated with each contracting party operating in their own self-interest
  
  (Holthausen, 1990). In contrast, the information perspective suggests that the accounting choices provide information about the firm’s future cash flows
  
  (Fields et al., 2001). In this perspective, accounting provides an avenue through which better-informed managers disseminate privately held information to less-well-informed investors
  （Watts & Zimmerman，1986），前兩個視角是 PAT 的核心，旨在解釋和預測管理者對會計方法的選擇。
  （Deegan，2014 年，第 323 頁）。 PAT 將公司視為公司內外各種自利個人之間合約的紐帶，並解釋瞭如何使用財務會計來最大限度地減少與每個締約方出於自身利益而運營相關的成本影響
  （霍爾索森，1990）。 相反，資訊視角表明會計選擇提供了有關公司未來現金流量的信息
  （菲爾茲等人，2001）。 從這個角度來看，會計提供了一種途徑，消息靈通的管理者可以透過該途徑向消息靈通的投資者傳播私人持有的訊息
  
  
  However, the actions of managers in a growth firm are more difficult for shareholders to supervise and monitor. Previous research confirms that growth firms are more likely to use incentive compensation schemes that tie management compensation to measures of firm performance (Smith & Watts, 1986), Despite many contradictory findings, opportunistic incentives are still the starting point for much research on accounting choice and earnings management. Three key hypotheses developed in the PAT literature are the
  political cost hypothesis, the debt hypothesis, and the bonus plan hypothesis. Despite many contradictory findings, opportunistic incentives are still the starting point for much research on accounting choice and earnings management. Three key hypotheses developed in the PAT literature are the
  
  political cost hypothesis, the debt hypothesis, and the bonus plan hypothesis. To mitigate this type of problem, this study investigates accounting policies only for intangible assets and links them to the market-to-book ratio, which indicates the intangible nature of a company.
  In line with the PAT political cost hypothesis that large firms prefer a less aggressive income strategy, the first hypothesis is formulated as follows: H1: Managers of larger firms prefer a less aggressive income strategy regarding intangible assets 然而，成長型公司經理人的行為對於股東來說更難以監督和監督。 先前的研究證實，成長型公司更有可能使用激勵性薪酬計劃，將管理階層薪酬與公司績效衡量標準連結起來（Smith & Watts，1986）， 儘管有許多相互矛盾的發現，但機會主義激勵仍然是會計選擇和盈餘管理方面許多研究的起點。 PAT 文獻中提出的三個關鍵假設是
  政治成本假說、債務假說和獎金計畫假說。
  儘管有許多相互矛盾的發現，但機會主義激勵仍然是會計選擇和盈餘管理方面許多研究的起點。 PAT 文獻中提出的三個關鍵假設是
  政治成本假說、債務假說和獎金計畫假說。
  為了緩解此類問題，本研究僅調查無形資產的會計政策，並將其與市帳率（顯示公司的無形性質）連結起來。
  根據 PAT 政治成本假設，即大公司偏好較不激進的收入策略，第一個假設表述如下：
  H1：大公司的管理者更喜歡針對無形資產採取較不激進的收入策略
  Financing business activities with debt produces a conflict of interest between the firm’s stockholders and bondholders.
  Smith and Warner (1979) describe primary sources of this conflict as dividend payment, claim dilution, asset substitution, and underinvestment.
  In regard to intangible assets, Aboody and Lev (1998) provide evidence that more leveraged US firms tend to capitalize software costs more aggressively A similar relationship was found with a German sample (Dinh et al., 2016). These findings are not confirmed in the case of R&D in France, where no significant difference in leverage between firms with aggressive accounting policy (capitalizers) and those with conservative accounting policy (expensers) was found (Cazavan-Jeny et al., 2011)
  However, one must notice that leverage is a proxy measure for the closeness to breaching debt covenants, which is often unknown to outsiders. Although there is some evidence that leverage is a good surrogate for proximity to accounting constraints (Press & Weintrop, 1990), results may be sensitive to the measure of leverage used and vary between different types of covenants.
  Assuming opportunistic behavior of the managers, the second hypothesis is as follows:
  H2: Managers of highly leveraged firms prefer a more aggressive income strategy regarding intangible assets 然而，成長型公司管理者的行為是透過債務為業務活動融資，從而在公司股東和債券持有人之間產生利益衝突。
  Smith 和 Warner (1979) 將這種衝突的主要根源描述為股利支付、債權稀釋、資產替代和投資不足。
  關於無形資產，Aboody 和 Lev（1998）提供的證據表明，槓桿率較高的美國公司傾向於更積極地資本化軟體成本
  德國樣本也發現了類似的關係（Dinh 等，2016）。 這些發現在法國的研發案例中並未得到證實，在法國，採用激進會計政策（資本化者）和採用保守會計政策（支出者）的公司之間的槓桿率沒有顯著差異（Cazavan-Jeny 等，2011）
  然而，必須注意的是，槓桿率是衡量違反債務契約的程度的一項代理指標，而外界往往不知道這一點。 儘管有一些證據表明槓桿是接近會計限制的良好替代指標（Press & Weintrop，1990），但結果可能對所使用的槓桿衡量標準敏感，並且在不同類型的契約之間存在差異。
  假設管理者有機會主義行為，第二個假設如下：
  
  H2：高槓桿企業的管理者更傾向於針對無形資產採取更積極的收入策略
  $million
  credit debit
  ----------- ------------
  100 cash 100 Bank loan
  50%
  100 tangible asset 100 capital
  
  0 intangible asset 0 Shareholders' equity
  ----------- ------------
  200 200
  
  
  PAT predicts that if managers’ compensation is related to accounting numbers, there are strong incentives for self-interested managers to choose income-increasing accounting policy. In this setting, managers act opportunistically when maximizing their own wealth at the expense of the stockholders Researchers must often use proxy measures for management compensation plans when testing the bonus plan hypothesis because, in many countries, companies do not disclose sufficient information in their annual reports.
  They assess compensation level in comparison to various performance measures, such as sales, assets, or earnings. Higher compensation, especially compared to a particular performance measure, increases the need for its justification, which creates stronger incentives to inflate earnings. Based on the above arguments, the following hypothesis is formulated:
  
  H3: Managers with a high compensation-to-sales ratio prefer a more aggressive income strategy regarding intangible assets. PAT預測，如果管理者的薪酬與會計數字相關，那麼自私的管理者就會有強烈的動機選擇增加收入的會計政策。 在這種情況下，管理者會採取投機行為，以犧牲股東利益為代價來最大化自己的財富
  研究人員在檢驗獎金計畫假設時必須經常使用管理階層薪酬計畫的代理衡量標準，因為在許多國家，公司在年度報告中沒有揭露足夠的資訊。
  他們會與各種績效指標（例如銷售額、資產或收益）進行比較來評估薪酬水準。 更高的薪酬，尤其是與特定績效衡量標準相比，增加了對其合理性的需求，從而產生了更強烈的誇大收入的動機。 基於上述論點，提出以下假設：
  
  H3：薪酬與銷售額比率高的管理者更傾向於在無形資產方面採取更積極的收入策略。
  
  到15 沒有提 variable 沒提independent dependent (regression 分析用)
  table5: univariate test 單變量檢驗
  table7:
  table10: 不知跟那個Hypo相關？
  table11: 分AB是用 lower and higher bookvalue
  
  Findings of the present study are in line with Windisch (2021), who finds that discretionary accruals are informative about firms’ future economic prospects, especially in a low enforcement environment
  本研究的結果與 Windisch (2021) 一致，後者發現可自由支配的應計費用可以為企業未來的經濟前景提供信息，尤其是在執法力度較低的環境中
  
  Despite many concerns about managerial self-interest, Dinh et al. (2019) find that managerial discretion is not used opportunistically, even for real activities, which is much more difficult to detect than accounting choices
  儘管對管理層自身利益存在許多擔憂，Dinh 等人。 （2019）發現，即使對於實際活動，管理自由裁量權也不會被機會主義地使用，這比會計選擇更難檢測
  
  
  
  Political Cost Hypothesis (by Bing-Copilot。)
  
  關於會計學的一個理論假設：政治成本假設（political cost hypothesis），這是一個用來解釋企業會計政策選擇的動機的假設。 我會嘗試為您簡要地介紹這個假設的內容和意義，並提供一些資料鏈接，供您進一步了解。
  
  政治成本假設的基本思想是，企業的會計數據會影響政府和社會對企業的監管和評價，因此企業會根據自身的利益，選擇那些能夠降低政治成本的會計政策。 政治成本是指企業因為其會計數據而面臨的政策限制、稅收支出、社會責任等負擔。 政治成本假設預測，企業的規模越大，其政治成本越高，因此大企業會傾向於選擇那些能夠降低當期報告盈餘的會計政策，以避免引起政府和社會的關注和干預。
  
  政治成本假設是一個具有重要意義的理論假設，它可以幫助我們理解企業會計政策選擇的影響因素和經濟後果，以及會計準則和監管機制的作用和效果。 政治成本假設也是實證會計研究的一個重要主題，許多學者通過不同的方法和數據，對這個假設進行了檢驗和驗證，並得到了不同的結論和發現。
  
  以上是我對您問題的回答，希望對您有所幫助。 如果您還有其他問題，歡迎繼續提問。 blush
  參考資料
  1:MBA智库百科 政治成本
  2: Taxes and Firm Size: Political Cost or Political Power?
  3: POLITICAL COSTS HYPOTHESIS Definition
  


• Patrix Presentation:
  HBO的 Meta Analysis論文，very inspired. 請詳看Patrik的報告
  像LinkedIn 就是 HRO的好來源
  Division of labor 分工
  Reyner: center of HR department, in Europe.
  ACP: 承包林口興業的內勤工作，就是一種HBO，符合潮流的趨勢。Run by the system+HBO
  李教授說：3/19見
  

W03 --本週課目標題--

2024-03-05-Tuesday 14:00-16:30 李正文 chengwen@cycu.edu.tw

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Dr.Chen (Asociate Professor)來presentaion講 AI and Language learning
Google grama extention.
AI and Me: Grammarly-
Reading & Writing
DeepL
wepik (AI presentation maker) Gamma

Using AI can be addictive

學不同口音Natural Reader的AI
promt of GPT:
Review this, for
examing this for
check this, evaluate the .. for ..
asses the .... for ...
please review this .... for grammatical errors
correct any grammatical errors

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